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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2004, the American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU")
threatened to sue the city of Redlands, California, if it did not remove
a small cross from its city seal.' The cross represented the city's
religious heritage and its history as a city of churches.2 Instead of
facing the possibility of litigation and the more daunting risk of losing
in court and being forced to pay the ACLU's attorneys' fees in addition
to its own, the Redlands City Council agreed to change the seal.3 The
City of Redlands not only could ill afford the risk of paying the ACLU's
attorneys' fees; it also had insufficient municipal funds to replace the
seal.4 Therefore, the city had to improvise. Blue tape covered the cross
on many city vehicles, and some city employees used electric drills to
"obliterate" the cross from their badges.5
After its success in Redlands, the ACLU turned its attention to
the Los Angeles County seal, which contained a small cross
symbolizing the Spanish missions that played an integral role in the
county's history.6 One newspaper columnist observed, "The cross was
about one-sixth the size of a not-very-big image of a cow tucked away
on the lower right segment of the seal, and maybe a hundredth of the
size of a pagan god (Pomona, goddess of fruit) who dominated the
seal."7 The county's attorneys advised that a loss in court would be
1. Marjie Lundstrom, At a Crossroads for Diversity, ACLU Helps Officials Take the Right
Path, SACRAMENTO BEE, June 3, 2004, at A3.
2. Roberto Hernandez, Group Wants Cross Restored to Redlands City Logo, PRESS
ENTERPRISE (Riverside, Cal.), June 15, 2004, at B3.
3. Lundstrom, supra note 1.
4. See id. (discussing methods used to cover or remove the cross from the seals).
5. Id.
6. J. Michael Kennedy, County Seal Has a Cross the ACLU Can't Bear, L.A. TIMES, May
25, 2004, at B3.
7. John Leo, How Many ACLU Lawyers Can Dance on the Head of a Pin?, MOBILE REG.,
Oct. 25, 2005, at A8.
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costly-the county would be responsible not only for the cost of
changing the seal and its own legal fees, but also for the ACLU's legal
fees.8 In what was an unpopular decision, the county supervisors voted
to redesign the seal.9 The transition to the new seal is costing the
county around $1 million and entails replacing the seal on
approximately 90,000 uniforms, 12,000 vehicles, and 6,000 buildings. 10
Events similar to these are taking place around the country.11
Some Americans view these events as victories over governments
endorsing a particular religion in violation of the First Amendment's
Establishment Clause and attempting to force religion upon their
citizens. Others believe that these events are examples of communities
being coerced into abandoning all acknowledgment of their religious
values and heritage. Debates over this issue have increased recently,
especially surrounding the Public Expression of Religion Act
("PERA"), which was introduced in Congress in response to events
such as those that took place in Redlands and Los Angeles.12 The U.S.
House of Representatives passed PERA on September 26, 2006.13 The
House forwarded the bill to the Senate, where it was referred to the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary and currently awaits action. 14
PERA would amend federal statutes to provide that plaintiffs who
challenge government action as violating the Establishment Clause
would not be able to recover attorneys' fees. This change would be a
departure from current federal law and practice, under which
plaintiffs who are successful in a lawsuit brought under the
Establishment Clause may (and almost always do) recover attorneys'
fees from the defendant government, whether local, state, or federal.
PERA's proponents argue that the current fee-shifting scheme,
8. 152 CONG. REC. H7389, H7393 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 2006) (statement of Rep. Hostettler).
9. See Troy Anderson, Vote on Cross Upheld Before Angry Crowd, L.A. DAILY NEWS, June
9, 2004, at Ni ("Despite passionate pleas from an overflow crowd of 2,000, Los Angeles County's
Board of Supervisors refused Tuesday to back down on its decision to remove a tiny Christian
cross on the official seal because of a legal threat from the ACLU."); Sue Fox, Officials Vote to
Replace County Seal, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2004, at B7 (discussing public opposition to the
board's decision to change the seal).
10. H.R. REP. No. 109-657, at 8 (2006) (citing Hannity & Colmes (Fox News television
broadcast Dec. 30, 2005)).
11. See infra notes 113-23 and accompanying text.
12. See H.R. REP. NO. 109-657 (2006) (stating that the Act is, in part, designed to "protect
cities and towns from . . . unfair and coercive practices," and naming the suits against Los
Angeles and Redlands among those that were the impetus for the Act).
13. 152 CONG. REC. H7422, H7423 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 2006).
14. 152 CONG. REC. S10874 (2006) (daily ed. Nov. 13, 2006) (listing H.R. 2679, the PERA
bill, among the bills to be passed along to the Senate). The sponsor of the bill in the Senate is
Sam Brownback, a Republican from Kansas. Veterans' Memorials, Boy Scouts, Public Seals, and
Other Public Expressions of Religion Protection Act of 2007, S. 415, 110th Cong. (2007).
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combined with the unpredictability of the Supreme Court's
Establishment Clause jurisprudence, allows plaintiffs to force
governments to accede to their demands and abandon all public
acknowledgment of religion by greatly increasing the risk involved in
defending Establishment Clause claims in court.
Like PERA, this Note recognizes that plaintiffs have an
inordinate amount of leverage when they bring an Establishment
Clause claim. Part II of this Note examines the two main factors
contributing to this leverage. The first factor is the unsettled state of
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Part II first introduces the
debate concerning the original purpose of the Establishment Clause. It
then discusses the many tests the Supreme Court has applied in
Establishment Clause cases and examines two recent cases that
scholars cite as exemplifying the muddled state of Establishment
Clause jurisprudence, Van Orden v. Perry15 and McCreary County v.
ACLU.16 Part II then examines the second factor, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983
and 1988, the federal fee-shifting statutes that enable successful
plaintiffs in Establishment Clause cases to receive attorneys' fees from
the defendant government.
Part III of this Note introduces PERA. It discusses the
background of the bill, presents its provisions in detail, and examines
the debates surrounding the bill. Part IV critically appraises PERA
and the solution it proposes. Although this Note concludes that PERA
is fundamentally flawed, it also asserts that a legitimate aim can and
should be extracted from the bill. This aim is to protect a government's
ability to defend the acknowledgment of its religious heritage. Part IV
demonstrates that the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause
jurisprudence allows for the acknowledgment of religious heritage and
explains why this acknowledgment needs protection. Part IV
concludes by examining why PERA's approach to this problem is
flawed.
Finally, Part V proposes an alternative to PERA that would
make it easier for governments to defend acknowledgments of their
religious heritage without reducing the incentives for governments to
avoid behavior that clearly violates the Establishment Clause. This
alternative exempts governments from having to pay a plaintiffs
attorneys' fees in Establishment Clause cases unless the challenged
conduct violates clearly established law. This "clearly established law"
standard is similar to the standard used in the Supreme Court's
qualified immunity jurisprudence, which this part outlines. Part V
15. 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
16. 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
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concludes by examining how courts could apply this standard in
Establishment Clause cases.
II. THE FACTORS EMPOWERING ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE PLAINTIFFS
A. Rife with Confusion: The Supreme Court's Establishment Clause
Jurisprudence
1. The Historical Debate: Voluntarism & Separatism Versus
Nonpreferentialism
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion." 17 These few words of the First Amendment, known as the
Establishment Clause, have created volumes of debate in recent years.
Federal courts consistently have disagreed about how government
action should be examined under the Establishment Clause.18 Even
Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding the clause is a study in
contradiction, as the Court has applied no fewer than five
Establishment Clause tests in recent years, often switching between
them without thorough explanation. 19 It is unsurprising that courts
have not been able to settle on a definitive application given the
continuing debate over the original purpose of the Establishment
Clause.
The most commonly accepted view of the purpose of the
Establishment Clause, and the one that has been the most influential
in shaping the Supreme Court's jurisprudence, is that adopted in the
1947 decision Everson v. Board of Education.20 In Everson, the Court
held that a state may reimburse parents for transportation expenses
incurred in sending their children to parochial schools. 21 The Court
announced that under the Establishment Clause, a government
cannot "pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer
one religion over another."22 However, the real legacy of the Everson
opinion, penned by Justice Hugo Black, has been twofold. First, it
interpreted the fundamental principles behind the Establishment
17. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
18. See infra Part II.A.1-3.
19. See infra Part II.A.2-3.
20. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
21. Id. at 17.
22. Id. at 15.
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Clause to be voluntarism and separatism. 23 Second, it incorporated the
Establishment Clause to apply to the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment. 24
In interpreting the animating principles of the Establishment
Clause to be voluntarism and separatism, Justice Black put great
weight on the views of James Madison and Thomas Jefferson. He
especially relied on the "Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty," which
Jefferson wrote and Madison sponsored in opposition to Virginia's tax
supporting an established church. 25 Voluntarism is the principle that
people should be free to choose a particular religion or no religion at
all and that religious groups should succeed or fail based on their own
merits, not because of state intervention. 26 Separatism is the principle
that both religion and government function best if they remain
separate and unentangled.27 The most influential expression of this
principle is Jefferson's statement that the First Amendment built a
"wall of separation between Church and State," which Justice Black
elevated to the level of constitutional doctrine in the Everson
opinion. 28 Since Everson, this quote has influenced most of the Court's
Establishment Clause tests and reasoning.
Once the Court interpreted voluntarism and separatism as the
animating principles of the Establishment Clause, it logically followed
that the clause should be incorporated against state action. As
Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments
23. See Kathleen M. Sullivan & Gerald Gunther, The Religion Clauses: Free Exercise and
Establishment, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1503, 1504-05 (15th ed. 2004); Laurence Tribe, Rights of
Religious Autonomy, in AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1154, 1160 (2d ed. 1988).
24. Everson, 330 U.S. at 8.
25. Id. at 11-13 ("This Court has previously recognized that the provisions of the First
Amendment, in the drafting and adoption of which Madison and Jefferson played such leading
roles, had the same objective and were intended to provide the same protection against
governmental intrusion on religious liberty as the Virginia statute." (citing Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879))). Among other things, the Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty
provided: 'That no man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious worship, place, or
ministry whatsoever, nor shall be enforced, restrained, molested, or burthened in his body or
goods, nor shall otherwise suffer on account of his religious opinions or belief .. " Id. at 13.
26. See Sullivan & Gunther, supra note 23, at 1505; Tribe, supra note 23, at 1160-61. This
principle plays a prominent role in James Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance Against
Religious Assessments. 2 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 183-91 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1901).
27. See Sullivan & Gunther, supra note 23, at 1505; Tribe, supra note 23, at 1161.
28. Everson, 330 U.S. at 16 ("In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of
religion by law was intended to erect 'a wall of separation between Church and State.' " (citation
omitted)). This quote is from a letter Thomas Jefferson wrote to the Danbury Baptists with the
purpose of silencing Federalist clergy who were criticizing Jefferson and the Republican Party
from the pulpit. 8 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 113 (H.A. Washington ed., 1869). Jefferson
wrote that clergy should not preach on politics and that the First Amendment built "a wall of
separation between church and State." Id.
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argued, an established State church, no less than a national church,
inevitably would persecute non-members and impede the freedom of
citizens to choose a particular religion voluntarily.29 Although the
Everson opinion's analysis justifying incorporation was not extensive,
the Court reasoned that voluntarism and separatism could not be
maintained unless the Establishment Clause applied to the States.30
Although the Court has largely accepted Black's view of the
Establishment Clause since Everson, a growing body of scholars, as
well as several Supreme Court Justices, has argued that this view is
incorrect. These scholars contend that the Establishment Clause was
not intended to provide strict separation between religion and
government, nor was it intended to apply to the States.31 They argue
that the Founders intended the Establishment Clause to perform two
main functions: (1) to prevent the federal government from
establishing a national church or religion; and (2) to prevent the
federal government from preferring one church or religion over
others. 32 This view of the Establishment Clause would allow
government support for religion that does not prefer one religion over
others, thus it is often called "Nonpreferentialism." Justices Rehnquist
and Thomas have supported this view in recent years.
In his dissent in Wallace v. Jaffree, Rehnquist took issue with
the Court's historical view of the Establishment Clause in Everson and
subsequent cases, particularly with the characterization of Madison's
and Jefferson's beliefs. 33 Rehnquist examined Madison's statements
and actions during the debates over the religion clauses in detail and
emphasized that Madison's original proposal prohibited the
establishment of a "national religion." 34 He concluded that, despite the
opinions expressed in Everson, Madison did not support a strict
separationist view of the Establishment Clause, but viewed the clause
as barring the establishment of a national religion and possibly
29. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 12 (citing Madison, supra note 26, at 183).
30. See id. at 15-16.
31. Two leading studies espousing this view are ROBERT L. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH
AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT FICTION 15 (1982) and MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, THE
GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY 23-27 (1965).
32. See, e.g., CORD, supra note 31, at 15, 20-23 (suggesting that the Establishment Clause
was intended to prevent "the establishment of a national church or religion, or the giving of any
religious sect or denomination a preferred status"); HOWE, supra note 31, at 23-27.
33. 472 U.S. 38, 92-99 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In Jaffree, the majority held that
Alabama statutes allowing silent prayer and meditation in public schools violated the
Establishment Clause. Id. at 60-61 (majority opinion).
34. Id. at 94 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 434 (1789)).
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preferential treatment of particular churches.35 Rehnquist also
objected to Everson's reliance on Jefferson's "wall of separation"
metaphor: "It is impossible to build sound constitutional doctrine upon
a mistaken understanding of constitutional history, but unfortunately
the Establishment Clause has been expressly freighted with
Jefferson's misleading metaphor for nearly 40 years."36 He noted that
looking to Jefferson in interpreting the Establishment Clause is "less
than ideal" because Jefferson was in France during the debates over
the Bill of Rights and did not use the metaphor until fourteen years
after the Bill of Rights was passed.37 Rehnquist concluded that the
"wall of separation" metaphor "should be frankly and explicitly
abandoned." 38
While the beliefs of Madison and Jefferson are popular subjects
of debate, at least one Justice has advised that the intentions of the
Founders may not be especially relevant to modern application of the
Establishment Clause. Two decades before Rehnquist's dissent in
Jaffree, in his concurrence to Abington School District v. Schempp,
which ended the practice of Bible-reading in public schools, Justice
Brennan wrote, "A too literal quest for the advice of the Founding
Fathers ... seems to me futile and misdirected.... ."39 He further
explained that (1) "the historical record is at best ambiguous, and
statements can readily be found to support either side of the
proposition"; (2) the Founders were preoccupied with the "imminent
35. Justice Rehnquist stated:
It seems indisputable from these glimpses of Madison's thinking, as reflected by
actions on the floor of the House in 1789, that he saw the Amendment as designed to
prohibit the establishment of a national religion, and perhaps to prevent
discrimination among sects. He did not see it as requiring neutrality on the part of the
government between religion and irreligion. Thus the Court's opinion in Everson-
while correct in bracketing Madison and Jefferson together in their exertions in their
home State leading to the enactment of the Virginia Statute of Religious Liberty-is
totally incorrect in suggesting that Madison carried these views onto the floor of the
United States House of Representatives when he proposed the language which would
ultimately become the Bill of Rights.
Id. at 98-99.
Justice Thomas later cited Rehnquist's Jaffree dissent in arguing that Madison, indeed, held
a nonpreferentialist view of the Establishment Clause. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ.
of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 856 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). Thomas also advocated that a more
lenient Neutrality Test should be applied to State action under the Establishment Clause.
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 677-80 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring). The majority
in Zelman held that a school voucher program was consistent with the Establishment Clause
because it did not prefer different religious schools over others. Id. at 639 (majority opinion). See
also infra text accompanying notes 65-69 (discussing Zelman).
36. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 92 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 107.
39. 374 U.S. 203, 237 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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question of established churches"; and (3) "our religious composition
makes us a vastly more diverse people than were our forefathers."40
Though there seems to be wisdom in Brennan's advice, the debate over
the intentions of the Founders continues to this day and significantly
influences the Supreme Court's view of Establishment Clause cases.
The varied views regarding the origins of the Establishment Clause
have helped create a dizzying array of Establishment Clause tests.
2. The Many Tests of the Supreme Court's Establishment
Clause Jurisprudence
"Rife with confusion." 41 "In hopeless disarray."42 "Suffer[ing]
from a sort of jurisprudential schizophrenia." 43 These are just a few of
the phrases federal courts have used to describe the Supreme Court's
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. As one professor observed,
"[T]he Supreme Court's establishment clause jurisprudence has
unified critical opinion: people who disagree about nearly everything
else in the law agree that establishment doctrine is seriously, perhaps
distinctively, defective."4 4 Another scholar wrote, "As a result of the
multitude of tests and opinions stemming from Supreme Court
Establishment Clause cases, there have been numerous
inconsistencies among lower courts, as well as a general sense of
confusion within society. . . ."45 Below is an overview of the major
tests the Supreme Court has used in its Establishment Clause
jurisprudence: the Lemon Test, the Endorsement Test, the Marsh
Test, the Coercion Test, and the Neutrality Test.
The most influential test in Establishment Clause
jurisprudence has been the Lemon Test. The Burger Court introduced
this test in its 1971 Lemon v. Kurtzman decision, which held that
States could not supplement the salaries of teachers teaching secular
subjects in religious schools. 46 The Lemon Test requires three
conditions to be met for a statute to be valid under the Establishment
Clause: "First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose;
second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither
40. Id. at 237-40.
41. Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ., 185 F.3d 337, 343 (5th Cir. 1999).
42. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 861 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
43. Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 165 F.3d 692, 717 (9th Cir. 1999).
44. Steven D. Smith, Separation and the "Secular": Reconstructing the Disestablishment
Decision, 67 TEX. L. REV. 955, 956 (1989).
45. Roxanne L. Houtman, ACLU v. McCreary County: Rebuilding the Wall Between Church
and State, 55 SYRACUSE L. REV. 395, 403-04 (2005).
46. 403 U.S. 602, 602 (1971).
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advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster an
excessive government entanglement with religion."47  Although
scholars and courts criticize and often disregard the Lemon Test,48 the
Court continues to cite it regularly, and it has never been formally
overruled. 49
In her Lynch v. Donnelly concurrence, Justice O'Connor refined
the Lemon Test by narrowing it to the purpose and effects prongs. 50
Under this Endorsement Test, the purpose prong "asks whether
government's actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion,"
and the effects prong focuses on whether the contested activity would
convey endorsement or disapproval to a reasonable observer. 51
O'Connor is concerned with government's endorsement of a particular
religion or religious activity because "[e]ndorsement sends a message
to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the
political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that
they are insiders, favored members of the political community."52
O'Connor's Endorsement Test was applied by the majority in County
of Allegheny v. ACLU in holding that a city's Christmas nativity scene
violated the Establishment Clause, but a separate display consisting
of a large menorah and Christmas tree did not.53 In distinguishing the
unconstitutional nativity scene in County of Allegheny from the
constitutional one in Lynch, the Court observed that the religiosity of
the Lynch scene was muted by other objects surrounding it, including
a talking wishing well, a clown, and a dancing elephant.5 4 Although
the Endorsement Test has been criticized by federal judges as "flawed
in its fundamentals and unworkable in practice" 55 and requiring
"scrutiny more commonly associated with interior decorators than
47. Id. at 612-13 (internal citations omitted).
48. See, e.g., Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 726 n.1 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(agreeing with the majority's refusal to apply the "discredited" Lemon Test); Wallace v. Jaffree,
472 U.S. 38, 110 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ('The three-part [Lemon] test represents a
determined effort to craft a workable rule from a historically faulty doctrine; but the rule can
only be as sound as the doctrine it attempts to service. The three-part test has simply not
provided adequate standards for deciding Establishment Clause cases, as this Court has slowly
come to realize.").
49. See Sullivan & Gunther, supra note 23, at 1547.
50. 465 U.S. 668, 689-90 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Lynch held that a city's
Christmas creche display was constitutional because of its historical origins. Id. at 686 (majority
opinion).
51. Id. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
52. Id. at 688.
53. 492 U.S. 573, 592-94, 601-02, 620 (1989).
54. Id. at 596.
55. Id. at 669 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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with the judiciary,"56 the Court has continued to apply it in some cases
involving religious displays on public property.
57
In Marsh v. Chambers, the Court abandoned the Lemon
inquiry altogether, upholding Nebraska's practice of having a State-
paid chaplain open each legislative session with a prayer. 58 The Court
instead examined the history of the practice and concluded:
In light of the unambiguous and unbroken history of more than 200 years, there can be
no doubt that the practice of opening legislative sessions with a prayer has become part
of the fabric of our society.... [I]t is simply a tolerable acknowledgement of beliefs held
among the people of this country. 59
Justice Kennedy later wrote, "Marsh stands for the proposition, not
that specific practices common in 1791 are an exception to the
otherwise broad sweep of the Establishment Clause, but rather that
the meaning of the Clause is to be determined by reference to
historical practices and understandings. '60 As can be seen, the Marsh
Test often would produce very different results from the other
Establishment Clause tests.
The Court adopted the Coercion Test in Lee v. Weisman, which
held that a rabbi-led prayer at a public school graduation ceremony
violated the Establishment Clause. 61 The Coercion Test asks whether
a contested activity could coerce objectors into taking part in a
religious activity.62 In Lee, the Court reasoned that because the
graduation ceremony was essentially obligatory, objectors to the
prayer would feel forced to participate.63 The Court said that the
Coercion Test is particularly appropriate for cases dealing with public
schools because schoolchildren are especially susceptible to peer
pressure and the risk of indirect coercion in schools is high.
64
The most recent addition to the Court's Establishment Clause
jurisprudence is the Neutrality Test, which is based on a
nonpreferentialist view of the clause.65 In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,
56. Am. Jewish Cong. v. City of Chicago, 827 F.2d 120, 129 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J.,
dissenting).
57. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 316 (2000) (holding that a
school district's policy of allowing student-led prayer at football games was a violation of the
Establishment Clause because it constituted an endorsement of religion).
58. 463 U.S. 783, 783 (1983).
59. Id. at 792.
60. County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 670 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part).
61. 505 U.S. 577, 586-87 (1992).
62. Id. at 588.
63. Id. at 586.
64. Id. at 592-93.
65. For more on the nonpreferentialist view, see supra notes 31-38 and accompanying text.
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the Court held that a school voucher program was consistent with the
Establishment Clause because it did not prefer religious schools of a
certain faith over other schools. 66 Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority
opinion focused on the neutrality of the program and explained that
"where a government aid program is neutral with respect to religion,
and provides assistance directly to a broad class of citizens who, in
turn, direct government aid to religious schools wholly as a result of
their own genuine and independent private choice," the program
usually will pass muster under the Establishment Clause. 67 Although
Justice O'Connor contended in her concurrence that the majority's
approach was simply a focused inquiry into the effects prong of the
Lemon Test, 68 there is no indication in Rehnquist's majority opinion
that he intended it to be so. 69 It appears that Zelman has added yet
another test to the Court's Establishment Clause repertoire.
3. Exemplars of Contradiction: Van Orden and McCreary County
Two recent Supreme Court decisions, Van Orden v. Perry and
McCreary County v. ACLU, often are cited as vivid examples of the
Court's muddled Establishment Clause jurisprudence. In these two
cases, both decided June 27, 2005, the Court handed down what
appear to be opposite holdings regarding the public display of the Ten
Commandments. In Van Orden, the Court held that a large stone
monument inscribed with the Ten Commandments located on the
grounds of the Texas state capitol building was constitutional under
the Establishment Clause. 70 However, in McCreary County, the Court
ruled that framed copies of the Ten Commandments hanging in the
hallways of two Kentucky courthouses violated the Establishment
Clause.71 Not only did the Court reach what appear to be opposing
decisions, but it also used different Establishment Clause tests in the
two cases.
The Van Orden plurality opinion, written by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas,
applied the Marsh Test in determining that there had been an
unbroken tradition acknowledging the Ten Commandments as an
66. 536 U.S. 639, 652-53 (2002).
67. Id. at 652.
68. Id. at 669 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
69. See id. at 652 (majority opinion).
70. 545 U.S. 677, 692 (2005).
71. 545 U.S. 844, 844-49 (2005).
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important part of America's heritage. 72 It also explicitly discarded the
Lemon Test as not useful in the case. 73 And the crucial fifth vote of the
majority, Justice Breyer, appeared not to apply any recognized test,
maintaining that justices should use their "legal judgment" in
borderline cases such as this: "I rely less upon a literal application of
any particular test than upon consideration of the basic purposes of
the First Amendment's Religion Clauses themselves."
74
In McCreary County, the majority opinion, written by Justice
Souter and joined by Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Ginsburg, and
Breyer, focused on the secular purpose prong of the Lemon Test.75 The
Court asked whether the display of the Ten Commandments had a
predominantly secular purpose and determined that it did not. 76 It
examined the history of the particular display in making this
determination. 77 In a probable reference to Van Orden, the Court
stated:
[I]t will be the rare case in which one of two identical displays violates the purpose
prong. In general, like displays tend to show like objectives and will be treated
accordingly. But where one display has a history manifesting sectarian purpose that the
other lacks, it is appropriate that they be treated differently .... 78
As Professor Douglas Laycock observed, the Supreme Court's holdings
in Van Orden and McCreary County ensure that "we will be litigating
these cases one at a time for a very long time. '79 Although these
holdings leave much doubt as to whether a particular display will be
found constitutional, governments still are forced to pay plaintiffs'
attorneys' fees if they decide to defend a display in court and
eventually lose.
B. The Fee-Shifting Statutes
Courts use §§ 1983 and 1988 of the United States Code to
award attorneys' fees to plaintiffs in suits in which a government
72. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 686-89 (citing as examples the portrayals of Moses and the Ten
Commandments adorning the U.S. Supreme Court, the Library of Congress, and the Department
of Justice).
73. Id. at 686 ("Whatever may be the fate of the Lemon test in the larger scheme of
Establishment Clause jurisprudence, we think it not useful in dealing with the sort of passive
monument that Texas has erected on its Capitol grounds.").
74. Id. at 700, 703-04 (Breyer, J., concurring).
75. McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 864.
76. Id. at 865-66.
77. Id. at 866.
78. Id. at 866 n.14.
79. Douglas Laycock, How to Be Religiously Neutral, LEGAL TIMES, July 4, 2005, at 43.
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deprived a citizen of his or her rights.8 0 Courts routinely award
attorney's fees to successful plaintiffs in Establishment Clause cases
under these statutes. Congress enacted § 1983 to "create a right of
action in federal court against local government officials who deprive
citizens of their constitutional rights by failing to enforce the law, or
by unfair and unequal enforcement." 81 The Court has held that § 1983
allows courts to award damages to plaintiffs when the challenged
government action violates their constitutional rights and causes a
compensable injury.82 However, courts rarely award damages in
Establishment Clause cases. The main reason § 1983 is important in
the Establishment Clause context is that it interacts with § 1988 to
allow attorneys' fees to be awarded in Establishment cases.
Section 1988, "The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of
1976," allows successful § 1983 claimants to recover attorneys' fees. 83
Section 1988(b) provides that in an action to enforce certain civil
rights statutes, including § 1983, "the court, in its discretion, may
allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable
attorney's fee as part of the costs. .".."84 This fee-shifting provision
creates an exception to the American Rule in the case of enumerated
civil rights claims. 85 The American Rule is the "general policy that all
litigants must bear their own attorney's fees, including the prevailing
party."86 The Supreme Court has held on multiple occasions that it
will not stray from the American Rule to award attorney's fees to a
prevailing party absent statutory authorization from Congress. 87 After
80. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988(b) (2000).
81. H.R. REP. No. 96-548, at 1 (1979), as reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2609. Section 1983
provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought
against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity,
injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or
declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of
Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a
statute of the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
82. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 255 (1978).
83. 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
84. Id. § 1988(b).
85. Id.
86. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 34 (2d pocket ed. 2001).
87. See, e.g., Buckhannon v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 532 U.S. 598, 602
(2001) ("[We follow a general practice of not awarding fees to a prevailing party absent explicit
statutory authority." (quoting Key Tronic Corp. v. U.S., 511 U.S. 809, 819 (1994)) (internal
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the Court made this position clear in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v.
Wilderness Society,88  Congress gave federal courts the explicit
authority to award attorneys' fees in certain civil rights cases by
enacting § 1988. As the Senate Committee Report on § 1988 explained:
"The purpose and effect of [the statute] are simple-it is designed to
allow courts to provide the familiar remedy of reasonable counsel fees
to prevailing parties in suits to enforce the civil rights acts which
Congress has passed since 1866. '89 Subsequently, the Supreme Court
has found that the central purpose of § 1988 is to enable victims of
civil rights violations to access the courts and to obtain competent
legal representation that they may not have been able to afford
otherwise. 90  This may help to explain why, although the
Establishment Clause clearly is not a civil rights law passed since
1866, federal courts uniformly use § 1988 as an instrument to award
attorneys' fees to successful plaintiffs in Establishment Clause cases.
Although the text of § 1988 leaves the decision to award
attorneys' fees to prevailing parties to the court's "discretion,"91 the
Supreme Court has limited this discretion. The Court has held that
courts should award attorneys' fees to prevailing plaintiffs "unless
special circumstances would render such an award unjust."92 It is not
clear what would constitute "special circumstances" because courts
simply do not find them. For all practical purposes, attorneys' fees are
awarded automatically to successful plaintiffs under § 1988. In
contrast, prevailing defendants may recover attorneys' fees only where
the suit is "vexatious, frivolous, or brought to harass or embarrass the
defendant."93 Thus, plaintiffs bringing Establishment Clause claims
can be confident that they will be awarded attorneys' fees if they are
successful, yet do not have to worry about paying the defendant's fees
if they are unsuccessful. The defendant governments, however, know
quotation marks omitted)); Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 269
(1975) ("Since the approach taken by Congress ... has been to carve out specific exceptions to a
general rule that federal courts cannot award attorneys' fees beyond the limits of [a
Congressional statute], those courts are not free to fashion drastic new rules with respect to the
allowance of attorneys' fees to the prevailing party in federal litigation ....
88. 421 U.S. at 269.
89. S. REP. No. 94-1011, at 2 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5909-10.
90. See, e.g., Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432, 437 (1991) ("[Tlhe overriding statutory concern [of
§ 1988] is the interest in obtaining independent counsel for victims of civil rights violations.");
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983) ('"The purpose of § 1988 is to ensure 'effective
access to the judicial process' for persons with civil rights grievances." (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-
1558, at 1 (1976))).
91. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2000).
92. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 429 (quoting Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402
(1968)).
93. Id. at 429 n.2 (citing Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978)).
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that they will have to pay plaintiffs' attorneys' fees if they
unsuccessfully defend an Establishment Clause claim and that they
have almost no chance of recovering their own fees. The unpredictable
state of Establishment Clause jurisprudence causes this risk of an
attorneys' fee award to loom especially large over a government's
decision of whether to defend a claim or settle.
III. THE PUBLIC EXPRESSION OF RELIGION ACT
A. Background of PERA
The Public Expression of Religion Act ("PERA") was introduced
in the House of Representatives by John Hostettler, a Republican
Congressman from Indiana, in May 2005.94 The bill's original title,
which stated its purpose, was: "To amend the Revised Statutes of the
United States to eliminate the chilling effect on the constitutionally
protected expression of religion by State and local officials that results
from the threat that potential litigants may seek damages and
attorney's fees."95 The House Committee on the Judiciary then revised
the title to read, "To amend the Revised Statutes of the United States
to prevent the use of the legal system in a manner that extorts money
from State and local governments, and the Federal Government, and
inhibits such governments' constitutional actions under the first,
tenth, and fourteenth amendments."96 Most notably, as the revised
title indicates, the bill was broadened to apply to lawsuits brought
against the federal government, as well as those brought against state
and local governments. 97 On September 26, 2006, the bill, as amended,
passed the House by a vote of 244-173.98 The bill then was sent to the
Senate and referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, where
it currently awaits action. 99
94. Public Expression of Religion Act of 2005, H.R. 2679, 109th Cong. (2005) (as introduced
in House, May 26, 2005). Rep. Hostettler subsequently lost his seat in the House in November's
election. Maureen Groppe, Democrat Ellsworth Ousts Hostettler in Bloody 8th, INDIANAPOLIS
STAR, Nov. 8, 2006, at A9.
95. H.R. 2679.
96. Veterans' Memorials, Boy Scouts, Public Seals, and Other Public Expressions of
Religion Protection Act of 2006, H.R. 2679, 109th Cong. (as passed by House, Sept. 26, 2006).
This is the version of the bill that will be cited for the rest of this Note.
97. H.R. REP. No. 109-657, at 2, 8-9 (2006).
98. 152 CONG. REC. H7422 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 2006).
99. 152 CONG. REC. S10874 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 2006) (listing H.R. 2679, the PERA bill,
among the bills to be passed along to the Senate).
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B. The Provisions of PERA
Section 1 of PERA states the bill's short title: "Veterans'
Memorials, Boy Scouts, Public Seals, and Other Public Expressions of
Religion Protection Act of 2006."100 Section 2 applies to Establishment
Clause suits brought against State and local officials. 1 1 This section
performs two main functions. First, it explicitly limits relief that can
be granted in Establishment Clause cases to injunctive or declaratory
relief. 10 2 It accomplishes this by amending 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which
provides a civil action for the deprivation of rights. 0 3 This means that
courts would be limited to ordering a government to cease an action
that violates the Establishment Clause or to declaring what the law is;
they would not be able to award monetary damages to successful
plaintiffs. Second, Section 2 provides that courts may not award
attorneys' fees to successful plaintiffs in Establishment Clause
cases.'0 4 It accomplishes this by amending 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), under
which courts routinely award attorneys' fees in such cases. 10 5
Establishment Clause cases covered by Section 2 include, but are not
limited to, those challenging:
(1) a veterans' memorial's containing religious words or imagery;
(2) a public building's containing religious words or imagery;
(3) the presence of religious words or imagery in the official seals of the several States
and the political subdivisions thereof; or
(4) the chartering of Boy Scout units by components of States and political subdivisions,
and the Boy Scouts' using public buildings of States and political subdivisions.
1 06
Section 3 of PERA applies the provisions of Section 2 to
lawsuits against the federal government and its officials. 10 7 Therefore,
Section 3 provides that plaintiffs successful in an Establishment
Clause claim against the federal government are entitled only to
injunctive or declaratory relief and cannot be awarded monetary
damages or attorneys' fees. 08 Section 3's coverage is very similar to
100. H.R. 2679 § 1. However, the act is still commonly referred to as the Public Expression of
Religion Act (PERA) and will be referred to as such in this Note.
101. Id. § 2.
102. Id. § 2(a).
103. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 80-82.
104. H.R. 2679 § 2(b).
105. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 83-90.
106. H.R. 2679 § 2(a).




Section 2's; however, it also explicitly covers challenges to religious
words or imagery in the U.S. seal, U.S. currency, and the Pledge of
Allegiance. 10 9 PERA's provisions are broad in scope and would alter
substantially the rules of Establishment Clause litigation.
C. The Debate over PERA
1. Beneath the Text: Politics as Usual
Technically, PERA concerns procedural litigation reform.
However, the underlying issue is a more controversial one: What is the
proper interaction between religious expression and government?
Unsurprisingly, the debate over PERA is partisan. The vote in the
House illustrates the divide. Of the 244 Representatives voting for
PERA, 218 were Republicans and 26 were Democrats. 110 Of the 173
nays, there were 166 Democrats, 6 Republicans, and 1 Independent."'
When analyzing the debates over constitutional interpretation and
legal precedent, two things become clear regarding the purposes
behind PERA. First, PERA is aimed at reducing challenges to specific
acts of religious expression that the bill's predominantly conservative
proponents view as permitted by the Constitution. Second, the
activities of the ACLU are at the center of PERA and the debates
surrounding it. These two facts highlight the political nature of PERA
and underlie the debates concerning the bill.
The short title of the bill depicts its proponents' aims quite
well. In Committee, the short title was changed from the "Public
Expression of Religion Act of 2005" to the "Veterans' Memorials, Boy
Scouts, Public Seals, and Other Public Expressions of Religion
Protection Act of 2006."112 The bill's proponents believe that
expression of religion in these contexts is appropriate and
constitutional; thus, they seek to reduce challenges to such expression.
Legislators changed the short title with specific events in mind, as is
evidenced by the Committee Report. The Report cited two recent cases
in which federal courts ordered crosses to be removed from veterans'
109. Id. § 3(b).
110. Office of the Clerk, U.S. House of Representatives, Final Vote Results for Role Call 480
(Sept. 26, 2006), http://clerk.house.gov/art-history/house-history/index.html (select "109th, 2nd
Session (2006)" from menu, then go to "Roll Calls 400 Thru 499," then go to "480") (providing a
break down of the vote by political party affiliation).
111. Id.
112. H.R. REP. No. 109-657, at 1 (2006).
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memorials. 113 First, in Buono v. Norton, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals ordered the removal of a six-foot cross from a veterans'
memorial located eleven miles from the main highway in Mojave
National Preserve in California. 114 The cross was erected on private
land in 1934 to honor fallen World War I soldiers, but in 1994 the area
was declared a national preserve. 115 The ACLU, representing retired
park ranger Frank Buono, successfully demanded that the cross be
removed because Buono, who passed by the memorial several times a
year, found it offensive. 116 Second, in the summer of 2006, a federal
judge ordered the City of San Diego to remove a cross from the Mount
Soledad Veterans' Memorial, erected over fifty years earlier on the site
of a memorial cemetery for veterans of the Korean War.117 In addition
to citing these cases, some proponents of PERA expressed concern that
the ACLU would attempt to have crosses removed from individual
soldiers' gravestones located in national cemeteries. 118
The Committee Report also cited situations where the ACLU
brought lawsuits against municipalities and the federal government
for supporting the Boy Scouts, an organization that allegedly forces
members to swear religious oaths.11 9 In the settlement of a lawsuit
concerning the San Diego Boy Scouts use of Balboa Park, the City of
San Diego prohibited the Boy Scouts from using the public park and
paid the ACLU $950,000.120 In response to a religious discrimination
lawsuit brought by the ACLU in 2004, the U.S. Department of Defense
agreed to end direct sponsorship of Boy Scouts units on military
facilities overseas and in the U.S.12 1 PERA's proponents' concerns over
public seals stem not only from the situations in Los Angeles and
113. Id. at 7-8 n.22.
114. 371 F.3d 543, 544-45, 550 (9th Cir. 2004).
115. Christopher Levenick, Houses of Worship: High Noon at Sunrise Rock, WALL ST. J., May
27, 2005, at W15.
116. Id.; H.R. REP. No. 109-657, at 8 n.22.
117. Paulson v. City of San Diego, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44740 (S.D. Cal. May 3, 2006); see
also H.R. REP. No. 109-657, at 7.
118. 152 CONG. REC. H7389, H7392 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 2006) (statement of Rep. Nadler).
However, the ACLU explicitly rejected this notion in a letter to the House Judiciary Committee.
Id. (explaining that symbols on gravestones are the choice of individual soldiers and their
families and thus are different from government-sponsored symbols).
119. H.R. REP. No. 109-657, at 8 n.22 (citing Press Release, ACLU, Pentagon Agrees to End
Direct Sponsorship of Boy Scout Troops in Response to Religious Discrimination Charge (Nov.
15, 2004)).
120. Id. at 6 n.13 (citing Seth Hettena, City of San Diego Settles Boy Scout Suit, AP ONLINE,
Jan. 8, 2004).
121. Id. at 8 n.22 (quoting Press Release, ACLU, supra note 119).
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Redlands described above, 122 as numerous other county and municipal
governments also have either agreed or been forced to remove crosses
from their seals.1 23
As even a cursory glance at the debates over PERA makes
clear, the ACLU is the primary target of this bill. The ACLU has
brought a large number of high-profile Establishment Clause lawsuits,
some of which have resulted in massive attorneys' fees awards.
PERA's proponents' main concern is that the ACLU lawsuits, or even
the mere threat of lawsuits, force governments to accede to the group's
demands without going to court. Several examples of this result
already have been described, including the situations in Los Angeles
and Redlands concerning their seals and the settlement in the lawsuit
over the San Diego Boy Scouts in which the ACLU received
$950,000.124 The ACLU also has acknowledged openly that it often
uses the threat of lawsuits against governments that could not afford
them to get its way. 125
Proponents of PERA complain that taxpayers must foot the bill
for the attorneys' fees awarded to the ACLU. 126 A few examples of
attorneys' fees awards the ACLU has received in recent years in just
Ten Commandments cases include: $150,000 from Barrow County,
Georgia for the removal of a framed copy of the Ten Commandments
122. See supra text accompanying notes 1-10 (describing how the threat of lawsuits by the
ACLU caused both the City of Redlands and the County of Los Angeles to remove crosses from
their government seals).
123. These governments include those of La Mesa, California; Zion, Illinois; Stow, Ohio;
Bernalillo, New Mexico; Rolling Meadows, Illinois; and Edmond, Oklahoma. See H.R. REP. No.
109-657, at 8 (citing Troy Anderson, Will the Law Wipe L.A. Off the Map?; Courts: ACLU
Challenge to Cross on County Seal Leads Some to Wonder If Holy City Names Are Next, LONG
BEACH PRESS-TELEGRAM, June 13, 2004, at Al). However, some courts have held that a cross
appearing on a public seal does not violate the Establishment Clause. See, e.g., Murray v. City of
Austin, 947 F.2d 147, 155 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that the city's insignia, which was adapted
from the city founder's coat of arms and contained a Christian cross, did not violate the
Establishment Clause), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1219 (1992).
124. See supra text accompanying notes 1-10, 120.
125. H.R. REP. NO. 109-657, at 7 (citing numerous ACLU press releases acknowledging this
tactic).
126. 152 CONG. REC. H7389, H7403 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 2006) (statement of Rep. King)
("American taxpayers currently have to pay for ACLU 'victories.' "). However, this is not always
the case, as many governments are indemnified for this type of judgment. Thus, many times
insurance companies end up footing this bill, not the taxpayers. For examples of state statutes
that authorize indemnification for government officials who are held liable under § 1983, see
Amanda K. Eaton, Note, Optical Illusions: The Hazy Contours of the Clearly Established Law




in the county courthouse; 27 $121,500 from Kentucky for the removal
of a Ten Commandments monument outside the state capitol;1 28 and
$550,000 from Alabama for the removal of the Ten Commandments
from a courthouse (shared with two other groups). 129 In addition to
complaining that taxpayers must foot these bills, PERA's proponents
perceive the awards as windfalls for the ACLU. They argue that going
to court is often a win-win situation for the ACLU and other advocacy
groups that use staff or volunteer lawyers. 130 If they lose a lawsuit,
they experience few financial consequences; however, if they win, they
often are awarded attorneys' fees at the private sector's market rate
and are able to use this money to fund more lawsuits. Proponents of
PERA say that this state of affairs encourages frivolous and coercive
Establishment Clause claims and that PERA would remedy this
problem.131
2. The Proponents
PERA's proponents argue that current litigation rules and
practices regarding the Establishment Clause are flawed in two main
ways. First, such rules and practices alter the constitutional freedom
of religion into a freedom from religion. Second, the rules, combined
with the muddled Supreme Court jurisprudence, force many
governments to settle outside of court and forego a defense of their
constitutional expression.
The First Amendment provides, "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof."132 According to the proponents of PERA, the first two
clauses of the First Amendment, the Establishment Clause and the
Free Exercise Clause, together provide for freedom of religion. When
governments are forced by threats of lengthy litigation and hefty
attorneys' fees to remove all religious expression from the public
square, the freedom of religion guaranteed by the First Amendment is
127. H.R. REP. No. 109-657, at 6 n.13 (citing Cameron McWhirter, 10 Commandments:
Barrow Removes Religious Display; County Complies with U.S. Judge, ATLANTA J.-CONST., July
20, 2005, at 1B).
128. Id. (citing Jack Brammer, State Legislature Foots the Bill for ACLU Victory; Group
Fought Lawmaker's Plan for Monument, LEXINGTON HERALD LEADER, July 8, 2003, at B1).
129. Id. (citing Kyle Wingfield, Legal Battle Over Ten Commandments Monument Will Cost
Alabama Taxpayers More Than $500,000, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 14, 2004).
130. 152 CONG. REC. H7389, H7393 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 2006) (statement of Rep. Hostettler).
131. See, e.g., id. (statement of Rep. Hostettler) ('The Public Expression of Religion Act
would make sure these cases are tried on their merits and are not merely used to extort behavior
via settlements outside our judicial system.").
132. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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converted into a freedom from religion. 133 The Committee Report notes
that the Supreme Court held that "the State may not establish a
religion of secularism in the sense of affirmatively opposing or
showing hostility to religion, thus preferring those who believe in no
religion over those who do believe. '134 Representative Mike Pence from
Indiana echoed the sentiments of many of the proponents when he
explained that by authorizing the awarding of attorneys' fees in
Establishment Clause cases, § 1988 has weakened the freedom of
religion:
It has become the tool of elements who would advance a radical secularist view of the
public square in America, and who have used the opportunity to access the public
Treasury in the form of attorney's fees to not only finance massive litigations against
government entities to scrub our public square of any vestige of reference to God or
reference to the religious heritage of the American people, but also it has been used to
prevent that day in court from happening.135
As is evidenced by Representative Pence's statements, PERA's
proponents' main concern is that the threat of having to pay the
plaintiffs attorneys' fees causes many governments to accede to
plaintiffs' demands and "scrub" the public square of all expression that
acknowledges religion. The threat of attorneys' fees is particularly
daunting for governments because of the current state of
Establishment Clause jurisprudence, which PERA's sponsor described
as "clear as mud."1 36 The Committee Report explained:
Caselaw under the Establishment Clause is so unpredictable that States and localities
know defending themselves in such lawsuits is fraught with uncertainty. The threat of
having to pay attorneys' fees in such cases should they happen to lose sometimes leads
States and localities to forego whatever rights they may have under the Constitution-
and concede to the demands of those bringing Establishment Clause lawsuits--often
before such cases even go to trial. 37
PERA's proponents believe that taking away the threat of attorneys'
fees in Establishment Clause cases would allow more governments to
defend themselves in court rather than to accede to the plaintiffs'
demands. They argue that the courts of law, not interest groups like
133. See, e.g., 152 CONG. REc. H7356, H7357 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 2006) (statement of Rep.
Gingrey) ("The first amendment is an absolute right and should not be misinterpreted to allow
these attacks on our freedom of religion. The attack on our religious heritage is just as wrong as
denying a person the freedom to worship. The Constitution guarantees the freedom of religion,
not freedom from religion.").
134. H.R. REP. No. 109-657, at 3 (quoting Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 225 (1963)).
135. 152 CONG. REC. H7389, H7400 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 2006) (statement of Rep. Pence).
136. Id. at 7393 (statement of Rep. Hostettler). The Supreme Court's Establishment Clause
jurisprudence is discussed supra Part II.A.2.
137. H.R. REP. No. 109-657, at 2 (internal citation omitted).
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the ACLU, should determine what government actions violate the
Establishment Clause. 138
3. The Opposition
In challenging PERA, opponents argue that its provisions
amending current litigation rules would (1) make it more difficult for
individual plaintiffs to challenge government action under the
Establishment Clause, (2) allow governments to violate the
Establishment Clause with impunity, and (3) set a dangerous
precedent. The opponents claim that without the possibility of
recovering attorneys' fees, many plaintiffs would be unable to
challenge Establishment Clause violations due to the high cost of
litigating such cases. 139 According to this view, lawyers would stop
representing plaintiffs on a pro bono basis because there would be no
chance of compensation, and individual plaintiffs often could not
afford to pay legal fees themselves. 140 The opponents concede that
groups like the ACLU and Americans United for Separation of Church
and State still would bring Establishment Clause challenges, but
claim that individuals should not have to rely on another group to
bring a suit when an individual right has been violated. 141
PERA's opponents reason that because it will be more difficult
for individuals to bring these suits, many Establishment Clause
violations will be insulated from judicial review. Many opponents go
further and claim that this is precisely what PERA is intended to
accomplish. They contend that the bill's proponents do not like the
federal courts' decisions concerning the public expression of religion,
so they are trying to rig the process in their favor and keep the
138. See, e.g., 152 CONG. REC. H7356, H7363 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 2006) (statement of Rep.
Hostettler) ("[Under PERA, a] blatant violation is determined by a court of law and not by ACLU
attorneys behind closed doors.").
139. See, e.g., 152 CONG. REC. H7389, H7401 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 2006) (statement of Rep.
Nadler).
140. See, e.g., 152 CONG. REC. H7356, H7357 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 2006) (statement of Rep.
McGovern) ("If this bill is enacted, attorneys will stop representing people who feel that their
rights are infringed upon because they won't be compensated for doing their jobs."); 152 CONG.
REC. E1904 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 2006) (statement of Rep. Etheridge) ("Few citizens can afford to
pay attorney fees that can total hundreds of thousands of dollars in these cases. In addition,
attorneys cannot always take cases, even on a pro bono basis, if they are unable to recoup their
fees and out-of-pocket costs when they prevail.").
141. See, e.g., 152 CONG. REC. H7389, H7401 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 2006) (statement of Rep.
Nadler) ("[T]he various organizations say that even if [the House of Representatives] pass[es]
this bill, they will still sue. But that is not the question .... [A]ny individual should have the
right and the ability to go to court.").
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religious expression from being challenged in court. 142 Law professor
Erwin Chemerinsky did not mince words in arguing that "[s]uch a bill
could have only one motive: to protect unconstitutional government
actions advancing religion."143 PERA's opponents also claim that
PERA would cause a breach in the separation of church and state,
invoking Thomas Jefferson's "wall of separation" rhetoric to bolster
their case.1 44 Representative Chet Edwards said:
[PERA] would not just chip away, it would chisel away, the wall of separation of church
and state .... By making it easier for government to step on the first amendment
religious rights of all Americans, this bill does damage to what Jefferson called, with
reverence, the wall of separation between church and state. 45
The opponents argue that the bill would allow governments to intrude
in the religious sphere, thus inhibiting individuals' religious
freedom. 146
Finally, opponents claim that PERA would set a "dangerous
precedent" by singling out "one of the constitutional protections
afforded in the Bill of Rights, and prevent its full enforcement."'1 47
They note that § 1983 has not been altered substantially since 1871
and never has been amended to limit the types of damages available
to a plaintiff raising a specific constitutional issue.148 Representative
Jerrold Nadler said, "We have always expanded rights under section
1983, our nation's oldest and most durable civil rights laws [sic]. ' 149
He adds that this change would disadvantage one class of people in
142. See, e.g., id.; 152 CONG. REC. H7356, H7357 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 2006) (statement of Rep.
McGovern) ("[T]here are some on the other side of the aisle who don't like some of the decisions
the courts have handed down in regards to the display of certain religious symbols; and since
they cannot win in court based on rights guaranteed in the Constitution of the United States, my
good friends on the other side of the aisle are now attempting to rig the process in their favor.").
143. Erwin Chemerinsky, Opinion, Legislating Violations of the Constitution,
WASHINGTONPOST.COM, Sept. 30, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2006/09/29/AR2006092901055.html.
144. 152 CONG. REC. H7356, H7358 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 2006) (statement of Rep. Edwards)
(quoting Jefferson's 1802 letter to the Danbury Baptists).
145. Id. at 7358-59.
146. See, e.g., id. at 7358 ("[T]his bill undermines the enforcement of the establishment
clause of the first amendment, which was designed exactly to protect Americans from
government intrusion into our faith.").
147. 152 CONG. REC. E1904 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 2006) (statement of Rep. Etheridge); see also
152 CONG. REC. H7389, H7402 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 2006) (statement of Rep. Hoyer) ('Make no
mistake, if this bill became law, it would single out one area of Constitutional Protections under
the Bill of Rights and prevent its full enforcement. Without question, that would set a dangerous
precedent.").
148. 152 CONG. REC. H7389, H7391 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 2006) (statement of Rep. Nadler)
(citing a memorandum from the Congressional Research Service confirming that in its history §
1983 had never been amended to limit the type of damages available).
149. Id.
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particular: religious minorities, who are usually the ones bringing
Establishment Clause challenges. 150 In summary, PERA's opponents
believe the act would enable governments to infringe upon individuals'
rights by endorsing religion in the public sphere with impunity.
IV. RIGHT IDEA, WRONG APPROACH: ANOTHER TAKE ON PERA
A. A Fundamental Flaw
While PERA's opponents raise several valid policy concerns
regarding the bill, there is a more fundamental flaw in PERA's
premise. The bill rests on the presumption that the government has a
constitutionally protected right to express itself. The original title of
the bill was "To amend the Revised Statutes of the United States to
eliminate the chilling effect on the constitutionally protected
expression of religion by State and local officials that results from the
threat that potential litigants may seek damages and attorneys'
fees." 151 However, the Constitution does not protect the expression of
religion by government officials when they are acting in their
governmental capacity. The First Amendment restrains the
government; it does not protect it. As an influential article on
government speech explained, "If the government can claim to act as a
First Amendment right holder, the First Amendment loses coherence,
for in such situations there is nothing for the First Amendment to act
on or constrain."'152
PERA's proponents also mischaracterize the scope of the bill.
They argue that it would hinder groups that seek to scrub the public
square of all religious expression. 153 However, scrubbing the public
square of all religious expression is not what is at issue in PERA.
Religious expression by private citizens and groups in the public
square involves an entirely different line of cases. 154 In fact, the extent
150. Id.; see also id. at 7402 (statement of Rep. Conyers) (arguing that the bill treats
religious minorities unfairly and leaves them without protection).
151. Public Expression of Religion Act of 2005, H.R. 2679, 109th Cong. (as introduced in
House, May 26, 2005) (emphasis added).
152. Randall P. Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many Faces of Government Speech, 86
IOWA L. REV. 1377, 1502 (2001).
153. See, e.g., 152 CONG. REC. H7389, H7390 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 2006) (statement of Rep.
Smith) (arguing that local governments are being forced to "ban religious people from using the
public square"); id. at 7400 (statement of Rep. Pence).
154. These cases deal with the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech. See, e.g.,
Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 120 (2001) (holding that a school board policy
excluding religious groups from the after-hours use of school facilities violated the groups'
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to which governments can regulate and prohibit religious expression
in the public square is restricted; they cannot use Establishment
Clause concerns as an excuse to hinder private citizens' freedom of
speech, even if it is religious speech in a public forum. 155 Despite the
rhetoric of PERA's proponents, the bill does not apply to private
religious expression; it applies to the government's expression of
religion. And the government has no constitutional right to express
religion. The Establishment Clause prohibits the government from
expressing religion for religion's sake. Therefore, PERA is flawed in
that it seeks to protect governments' expression of religion when no
such right exists.
B. A Legitimate Aim: Protecting the Acknowledgment of
Religious Heritage
Though PERA is based on the flawed premise that the
government has a right to religious expression, its aims should not be
entirely discarded. PERA correctly identifies a situation that is worthy
of reform. Under current litigation rules, special interest groups like
the ACLU are able to coerce governments into abandoning references
to the heritage of their citizens and cultures if this heritage happens to
be religious. Though the Establishment Clause prohibits governments
from expressing religion for religion's sake, it does not prohibit them
from acknowledging their religious heritage. This form of government
expression, acknowledging a religious heritage, still is not a
constitutional right. However, it is a value that the legislature may
choose to protect. The Supreme Court's Establishment Clause
freedom of speech); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 862 (1995)
(holding that a public university's refusal to subsidize a religious student organization's
periodical, when it subsidized many nonreligious groups' periodicals, constituted viewpoint
discrimination not allowed by the First Amendment's free speech guarantees); Capitol Square
Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 770 (1995) (holding that a private group must be
granted a permit to erect a cross on a state-owned plaza, because the plaza was a public forum
and denying all religious displays would violate the First Amendment's free speech guarantees);
Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 394 (1993) (overturning a
school board policy permitting outside groups to use school facilities unless they presented
religious viewpoints).
155. See, e.g., Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 112 ("Milford argues that, even if its restriction
constitutes viewpoint discrimination, its interest in not violating the Establishment Clause
outweighs the Club's interest in gaining equal access to the school's facilities.... We disagree.");
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 846 ("There is no Establishment Clause violation in the University's
honoring its duties under the Free Speech Clause."); Capitol Square, 515 U.S. at 767 ("[The
Establishment Clause does not] serve as an impediment to purely private religious speech
connected to the State only through its occurrence in a public forum."); Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S.
at 395 (holding that the fear of violating the Establishment Clause is not a valid defense to a
claim that the government violated the plaintiffs freedom of speech).
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jurisprudence permits governments to acknowledge their religious
heritage in many circumstances and recognizes this constitutional
acknowledgment as a legitimate target of legislative and judicial
protection.
1. Acknowledgment of Religious Heritage in the
Establishment Clause Tests
Although the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause
jurisprudence is confused and unsettled as to exactly which activities
and displays the clause prohibits, it clearly allows some government
acknowledgment of religious heritage. None of the tests that the Court
has used to evaluate public religious displays, namely the Lemon Test,
the Endorsement Test, and the Marsh Test, presents a blanket
prohibition of all expression that could be construed as religious. 156 All
three take into account the purpose and history of the display or
action. The first prong of the Lemon Test examines whether the
government's action or display has a secular purpose. 157 The
Endorsement Test, arguably the most popular choice for evaluating
religious displays, also focuses on the secular purpose of the display.
As Justice O'Connor explained, "[T]he reasonable observer in the
endorsement inquiry must be deemed aware of the history and context
of the community and forum in which the religious display
appears."158 Finally, the Marsh Test most consciously examines the
relationship between a display and its locality's heritage. In upholding
Nebraska's practice of having a state-paid chaplain open each
legislative session with a prayer, the Court held that the practice was
''simply a tolerable acknowledgement of beliefs widely held among the
people of this country." 159 Federal courts of appeal have relied on the
Marsh Test to allow governments to acknowledge their religious
heritage through a courthouse display of the Ten Commandments on a
bronze plaque,160 invocations at a county board meeting,1 61 the
maintenance of a prayer room in a state capitol building,162 and a
cross adorning a city's insignia adapted from its founder's coat of
156. The Court does not use the Coercion Test or the Neutrality Test to evaluate religious
displays.
157. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
158. Capitol Square, 515 U.S. at 780 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also County of Allegheny
v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 630 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part) (explaining that "history
and ubiquity" are relevant under the Endorsement Test).
159. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983).
160. Freethought Soc'y v. Chester County, 334 F.3d 247, 270 (3d Cir. 2003).
161. Simpson v. Chesterfield County Bd. of Supervisors, 404 F.3d 276, 278 (4th Cir. 2005).
162. Van Zandt v. Thompson, 839 F.2d 1215, 1217-18 (7th Cir. 1988).
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arms. 163 However, the most notable reliance on Marsh came in the
plurality opinion of Van Orden.164
2. Van Orden and McCreary County Revisited
Revisiting Van Orden and McCreary County, the two Ten
Commandments cases often cited as exemplifying the muddled state of
Establishment Clause jurisprudence, shows that the cases may not be
as inexplicable as many commentators claim.165 In Van Orden, the
Court held that the Establishment Clause permitted a stone monolith
of the Ten Commandments to be displayed on the grounds of the
Texas State Capitol. 166 In contrast, the Court held in McCreary County
that framed copies of the Ten Commandments hanging in two
Kentucky courthouses violated the Establishment Clause. 167 Because
Justice Breyer was the only Justice to vote differently in the two
cases, with his apparent switch producing the difference in holdings, it
is especially enlightening to examine his reasoning. 168 In Van Orden,
Breyer did not use a specific Establishment Clause test, but said that
Justices should use their "legal judgment" in cases such as this. 16 9 It
appears that Breyer's "legal judgment" focuses on whether the
government's display acknowledges the community's heritage or has a
more overtly religious function. Breyer reasoned that the monument
at the Texas Capitol was "used as a part of a display that
communicates not simply a religious message, but a secular message
as well," and he emphasized the 40-year history of the particular
monument. 170 He explained:
This case also differs from McCreary County, where the short (and stormy) history of the
courthouse Commandments' displays demonstrates the substantially religious objectives
of those who mounted them .... That history there indicates a governmental effort
substantially to promote religion, not simply an effort primarily to reflect, historically,
the secular impact of a religiously inspired document.171
Thus, the reason why the Court found the Ten Commandments
monument in Van Orden acceptable under the Establishment Clause,
163. Murray v. City of Austin, 947 F.2d 147, 155 (5th Cir. 1991).
164. See supra text accompanying note 72.
165. See supra Part II.A.3.
166. 545 U.S. 677, 692 (2005).
167. 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
168. He voted that the display in Van Orden was permitted by the Establishment Clause,
545 U.S. at 699-706 (Breyer, J., concurring), but that the display in McCreary County violated it,
545 U.S. at 849.
169. 545 U.S. at 700, 703-04 (Breyer, J., concurring).
170. Id. at 701.
171. Id. at 703.
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while the framed depictions in McCreary County were not, is that the
Texas monument's main function was to acknowledge the role the Ten
Commandments played in the history, culture, and politics of the
state, not to advance a particular set of religious beliefs. 172 This
distinction could only be made after detailed inspections of the facts
surrounding the cases and the particular histories of the individual
displays.
Upon closer inspection, it appears that the different holdings in
Van Orden and McCreary County are not simply the product of
confused jurisprudence. They are better viewed as products of the
complex analysis and inherent conflict involved in Establishment
Clause cases, which often cause outcomes to be unpredictable. This
inherent conflict is why the Establishment Clause does not lend itself
well to strict tests or bright line rules. The subtle analysis involved
requires courts to examine closely the facts of each particular case.
Though this type of decisionmaking can be advantageous and may be
necessary in order for courts to stay true to a general mandate such as
the Establishment Clause, it creates great uncertainty for
governments as to what particular acknowledgments of religion are
permissible under the clause.
3. Why the Acknowledgment of Religious Heritage Needs Protection
The reason that governments' acknowledgment of religious
heritage is vulnerable is not that the Supreme Court's Establishment
Clause jurisprudence forbids it; it is because many governments do
not have the ability or incentive to defend such acknowledgments in
the courts of law. This Note has outlined the main factors contributing
to this inability or unwillingness to defend such challenges. 173 First, §§
1983 and 1988 ensure that the defendant government will have to pay
the plaintiffs attorneys' fees if it loses in court. 174 Although these fee-
shifting provisions perform a valuable function in many cases, they
are not appropriate in cases challenging a government's
acknowledgment of its religious heritage. As one First Amendment
scholar and attorney noted, "Sections 1983 and 1988 are particularly
suited for those cases in which the plaintiffs are ill-financed and
where the law is relatively predictable."1 75 Neither of these conditions
172. Id.
173. See supra Part II.
174. See supra Part II.B.
175. Public Expression of Religion: Hearing on H.R. 2679 Before the H. Comm. on the




is present in most suits challenging a government's acknowledgment
of its religious heritage. Many of these suits are brought by well-
financed interest groups like the ACLU, who have conceded that an
inability to be awarded attorneys' fees would not deter them from
bringing claims. 176 Additionally, the unpredictability of current
Establishment Clause jurisprudence has been well documented. 177
With the Establishment Clause jurisprudence so unpredictable, even
at the Supreme Court level, there is always a substantial risk that the
government will lose in court and be forced to pay the plaintiffs
attorneys' fees.
Under this state of affairs, plaintiffs who bring an
Establishment Clause claim, or even potential plaintiffs who threaten
to do so, have an inordinate amount of leverage over the defendant
government. Section 1988 provides governments with a very strong
incentive to accede to the demands of the plaintiff and not defend the
acknowledgment of its religious heritage in court. Another, more
subtle factor detracting from the government's incentives to defend
such suits is the cost of the government's own attorneys' fees and
litigation expenses. When calculating these costs, the virtual certainty
of several rounds of appeals, even if the government wins at the
district court level, must be factored in to the equation. The
combination of these factors makes it very difficult for a government
to justify financially the decision to defend its religious heritage. The
financial factors, which are often the factors that speak loudest to
local governments, all point to settling with the plaintiff rather than
allowing the dispute to go to court.178 The main incentives to defend
the lawsuit are often only the desires to preserve the heritage of the
municipality, state, or country, and to represent the will of the
majority of citizens. While choosing this course may be possible for
some large and wealthy governments, many localities do not have the
luxury to pursue this option.1 79 Even if a government has the
176. See, e.g., 152 CONG. REC. H7389, H7394 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 2006) (statement of Rep.
Smith) (quoting an ACLU staff attorney who stated that an inability to receive attorneys' fees in
Establishment Clause cases "wouldn't stop us from bringing lawsuits"); 152 CONG. REC. H7356,
H7359 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 2006) (statement of Rep. Gingrey) (noting that the ACLU has said
clearly that it would continue to bring lawsuits even if receiving attorneys' fees was not an
option).
177. See supra Part II.A.2-3.
178. Although it may be expensive to remove religious imagery or words from government
property, a government risks having to pay for this removal in addition to all the legal fees if it
loses in court.
179. The City of Redlands is an example of a government that could not afford to defend an
Establishment Clause claim. See supra text accompanying notes 1-5.
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necessary funds, the financial incentives of settlement may win out.180
Therefore, governments are incentivized to settle even when they have
a strong case that their acknowledgment of religious heritage is
permitted under the Establishment Clause.
This state of affairs also creates a self-censorship problem.
With the prevalence of Establishment Clause claims being brought by
powerful groups like the ACLU and Americans United for Separation
of Church and State and the risks that accompany these lawsuits,
governments are likely to steer clear of actions that may draw the
attention of these groups. Even in the absence of a lawsuit, a
government may feel pressured to avoid acknowledging its religious
heritage. Therefore, if the ability of governments to defend the
acknowledgment of their religious heritage remains unprotected, they
will be forced to sweep all references that could be construed as
religious under the proverbial doormat. An integral part of the history,
culture, and mores of this country will become taboo.
C. All or Nothing: PERA's Extreme Approach
While the goal of protecting the ability of governments to
acknowledge their religious heritage is a legitimate and worthy one,
the manner in which PERA would accomplish this goal is flawed.
PERA applies not only to Establishment Clause claims challenging
government actions acknowledging a religious heritage or claims
where the law is unclear, but to all Establishment Clause claims. 81
Its solution cuts too wide a swath. As the bill's critics have pointed
out, PERA would take away a successful plaintiffs right to be
awarded attorney's fees even in cases concerning government action
that clearly violates the Establishment Clause.18 2 While it is debatable
whether this would insulate such violations from judicial review as
PERA's opponents have argued, it almost certainly would reduce the
incentive for governments to settle these obvious cases as early as
possible. This is an especially great concern when a government is
180. Los Angeles County is an example of the financial incentives winning out. See supra
text accompanying notes 6-10.
181. Veterans' Memorials, Boy Scouts, Public Seals, and Other Public Expressions of
Religion Protection Act of 2006, H.R. 2679, 109th Cong. § 2(b) (as passed by House, Sept. 26,
2006). PERA lists certain forms of government expression that are included in the bill's scope,
but does not limit itself to these enumerated forms. Id.
182. See, e.g., 152 CONG. REC. H7389, H7398 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 2006) (letter from
Americans United for Separation of Church and State) (noting that PERA applies "even in cases
where the law is most clearly on the plaintiffs side"); Chemerinsky, supra note 143 ("[PERA]
applies even to cases involving illegal religious coercion of public school children or blatant
discrimination against particular religions.").
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represented on a pro bono basis by a faith-based law firm, as is
increasingly the case. 183
Therefore, PERA presents an all-or-nothing solution. Under
current litigation rules, governments are encouraged to settle all
Establishment Clause claims concerning religious expression, even
those in which the government has the legitimate purpose of
acknowledging its religious heritage. However, under PERA's solution,
an important incentive for governments to settle-the threat of
attorneys' fees-would be absent in all Establishment Clause claims,
even those challenging blatantly unconstitutional action. This Note
advocates a solution that occupies the middle ground between these
two extremes.
V. AN ALTERNATIVE TO PERA: A CLEARLY ESTABLISHED
LAw STANDARD
A. The Advantages of a Clearly Established Law Standard
This Note advocates exempting Establishment Clause claims
from the applicable federal fee-shifting statutes (§§ 1983 and 1988),
unless the challenged government conduct violates clearly established
law. This solution protects governments' ability to defend
acknowledgments of their religious heritage, but unlike PERA, it does
so without reducing deterrents to behavior that blatantly violates the
Establishment Clause. The major advantages of this solution are
twofold. First, plaintiffs no longer would be able to use the threat of
attorneys' fees to coerce governments into settling cases in which they
have the legitimate purpose of acknowledging their religious heritage.
Second, the threat of attorneys' fees still would encourage
governments to settle cases in which their action is clearly
unconstitutional.
Under this solution, the pressure on governments to settle
cases in which they have a legitimate interest in honoring and
preserving their religious heritage would be lessened. Governments
would be more likely to defend claims calling for the removal of
religious imagery from veterans' memorials, public seals, public
buildings, and other displays. The courtroom would become more
accessible to governments. The courts, rather than special interest
groups, would decide which forms of government action are
183. See, e.g., 152 CONG. REC. H7389, H7398 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 2006) (letter from
Americans United for Separation of Church and State).
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constitutional acknowledgments of religious heritage and which are
prohibited. Allowing more of the cases occupying the gray areas of
Establishment Clause jurisprudence to go to court also would provide
federal courts with the opportunity to establish clear doctrine and
bring stability to these unsettled areas of the law.
While the courts would become more accessible to governments
with a legitimate defense, the incentives for governments to settle
when they do not have a legitimate defense would remain in place.
Continuing to require governments to pay a successful plaintiffs
attorneys' fees when the law is clearly established avoids many of the
concerns of PERA's critics. Potential plaintiffs still could rely on
receiving attorneys' fees if they challenged a government action that
clearly violated the Establishment Clause. Therefore, this solution
would not discourage potential plaintiffs with strong claims from
bringing them; it only would encourage potential plaintiffs with weak
claims to think more carefully before suing the government. Nor
would it insulate violations of the Establishment Clause from judicial
review. This exemption would not apply in situations where the
government is blatantly or purposely violating the Establishment
Clause. The incentives for governments to cease their violation as soon
as possible still would be in place. Another advantage of this solution
is that there is precedent for a "clearly established law" standard in
the constitutional law context.
B. Precedent: The Qualified Immunity Standard
The qualified immunity doctrine offers a workable standard for
courts to apply in Establishment Clause cases. This common law
doctrine exempts government actors from personal liability stemming
from acts performed in their official capacity unless their conduct
violates clearly established law.18 4 The Supreme Court introduced the
current version of the standard in the 1982 case Harlow v. Fitzgerald:
"[G]overnment officials performing discretionary functions generally
are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct
does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known."18 5 The "clearly
established" requirement serves to protect government officials that
184. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 n.30 (1982).
185. Id. at 818 (emphasis added).
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truly and reasonably believed that their conduct was proper under the
law. 186
Subsequent cases have attempted to clarify when law is
"clearly established." Generally, factually similar case law is required
to give the government official fair notice that certain conduct clearly
violates the Constitution.18 7 Precedent from the Supreme Court or the
Court of Appeals in the circuit in which the conduct took place would
satisfy this requirement, as would a "consensus" of precedent in other
jurisdictions.1 8 8 However, the facts of the prior case law do not have to
be nearly identical or "materially similar" to satisfy the
requirement.'8 9 Also, factually similar case law is not required in cases
where the conduct so obviously violates the Constitution that a
reasonable official could not have thought otherwise. 90
C. Applying the Standard to Establishment Clause Cases
The qualified immunity standard is well suited to the issue of
when to award attorneys' fees in Establishment Clause cases. Under
the standard, defendant governments would be exempt from having to
pay a successful plaintiffs attorneys' fees unless the conduct at issue
violates "clearly established" law. The "clearly established"
requirement would ensure that governments had fair notice that
particular conduct violated the Establishment Clause before they
faced the threat of attorneys' fees. This requirement is particularly
appropriate considering the unpredictable state of Establishment
Clause jurisprudence. It would alter the present situation in which
governments are punished for a misstep in a field where even federal
judges are unclear on what the law is. The government still may lose
the case, but it would not be punished with having to pay the
plaintiffs attorneys' fees unless factually similar precedent existed or
its conduct blatantly violated the Establishment Clause.
In the qualified immunity context, the clearly established law
standard was intended to be applied by the court at the summary
judgment stage of the proceedings, so the issue of whether a
government official was exempt from liability could be resolved
186. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638-41 (1987) (discussing traditional
extension of qualified immunity to government actors in their official duties).
187. Id. at 640.
188. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615-17 (1999).
189. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002).
190. See United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 271 (1997) (holding that qualified immunity
does not apply to a state judge who solicited sexual favors from a party in a suit before his court,
even though there was no factually similar case law).
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quickly and up-front. 191 However, in the attorneys' fees context, the
standard would not need to be applied until a final judgment was
rendered, and then only if the plaintiff was successful. Therefore, the
test could be easier to apply in the attorneys' fees context, because the
court would have heard arguments regarding the applicable law
during the full trial and would be well situated to make the
determination of whether the law was clearly established.
The objective nature of the standard is also conducive to
Establishment Clause cases. The inquiry asks whether a "reasonable
person" would have known that the conduct at issue violated clearly
established law. Because most of the conduct challenged under the
Establishment Clause cannot be traced to a single government actor, a
subjective standard would not be workable. However, if a reasonable
person would have known that the conduct clearly violated the
Establishment Clause, it is appropriate to assume that the
government as a whole should have known as well.
A particular advantage of this standard is that it evolves with
the jurisprudence. In areas where Establishment Clause
jurisprudence is unsettled, governments do not have to face the threat
of attorneys' fees because they could not be expected to know that
their conduct was unconstitutional. However, as federal courts hand
down decisions concerning specific Establishment Clause issues, the
jurisprudence may become more clearly established, and governments
would be put on notice that they may have to pay attorneys' fees if
they repeat the same violations.
Although Establishment Clause jurisprudence as a whole is
unsettled compared to other areas of constitutional law, the law
concerning many important issues has been clearly established.
Therefore, this solution would not eliminate the possibility of an
attorneys' fee award in Establishment Clause cases across-the-board.
Clear precedent exists holding that many government actions violate
the Establishment Clause. For example, establishment issues
regarding public schools have been litigated heavily, and much of the
law in this area is clearly established.192 In these areas of
191. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
192. For examples of Supreme Court precedent regarding public schools, see, e.g., Santa Fe
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 318 (2000) (holding that a school district's allowing
student-led prayer at football games violated the Establishment Clause); Lee v. Weisman, 505
U.S. 577, 585-86 (1992) (holding that a rabbi-led prayer at a public school graduation violated
the Establishment Clause); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 60-61 (1985) (holding that Alabama
statutes allowing silent prayer and meditation in public schools violated the Establishment
Clause); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225-27 (1963) (holding that mandatory
Bible reading in public schools violated the Establishment Clause); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,
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Establishment Clause jurisprudence where the law is clearly
established, governments would still face the threat of attorneys' fees.
And even in the absence of clear precedent, governments would be
forced to pay the plaintiffs attorneys' fees where their conduct so
obviously violated the Establishment Clause that they could not have
reasonably thought otherwise.
Admittedly, this solution would apply to some Establishment
Clause claims outside of those challenging an acknowledgment of
religious heritage. That area of Establishment Clause jurisprudence is
not the only one that is unsettled. However, this is not necessarily an
undesirable side effect. The same fairness concerns that exist in the
context of acknowledging religious heritage are raised when
governments are punished for other conduct that is not clearly
unconstitutional. The "clearly established law" caveat ensures that the
solution allows governments to defend conduct that is arguably
constitutional, such as the acknowledgment of religious heritage,
without sacrificing the protections the Establishment Clause provides
citizens.
VI. CONCLUSION
The interpretation and application of the Establishment Clause
requires the maintenance of a subtle balance, which the plurality in
Van Orden vividly described:
Our cases, Januslike, point in two directions in applying the Establishment Clause. One
face looks toward the strong role played by religion and religious traditions throughout
our Nation's history .... The other face looks toward the principle that governmental
intervention in religious matters can itself endanger religious freedom.... One face
looks to the past in acknowledgment of our Nation's heritage, while the other looks to
the present in demanding a separation between church and state. Reconciling these two
faces requires that we neither abdicate our responsibility to maintain a division between
church and state nor evince a hostility to religion by disabling the government from in
some ways recognizing our religious heritage. 93
Currently, governments are being forced to ignore the integral role
religion has played in our Nation's heritage. Federal fee-shifting
statutes, which force governments to pay the attorneys' fees of
plaintiffs who successfully challenge government conduct under the
Establishment Clause, provide potential plaintiffs with an inordinate
amount of leverage. The risk of having to pay the plaintiffs attorneys'
fees is intensified by the unpredictable state of Establishment Clause
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jurisprudence. Powerful interest groups such as the ACLU have been
especially effective in utilizing this state of affairs to pressure
governments to accede to their demands. The combination of these
factors leaves many governments with little choice but to abandon all
acknowledgment of their religious heritage and forego defending their
conduct in court.
The Public Expression of Religion Act ("PERA") was introduced
in Congress to reduce the settlement pressure currently placed on
governments that face Establishment Clause lawsuits. PERA would
make it easier (and more likely) for governments to defend
Establishment Clause claims by amending federal fee-shifting
statutes to provide that plaintiffs who challenge government conduct
under the Establishment Clause would never be able to recover
attorneys' fees. While PERA's aim of making it practicable for
governments to defend the acknowledgment of their religious heritage
is a legitimate one, the bill goes too far. In taking away the right of
plaintiffs to recover attorneys' fees in all Establishment Clause cases,
PERA reduces the deterrents for governments to avoid blatantly
unconstitutional conduct. PERA's solution focuses too intently on the
importance of religion in our Nation's heritage, while failing to
recognize that there are circumstances in which citizens should be




The course of action proposed by this Note strikes a balance
between the current state of affairs and the one that PERA would
create. This alternative to PERA would exempt Establishment Clause
claims from the applicable federal fee-shifting statutes unless the
challenged government conduct violated clearly established law. This
"clearly established law" standard, for which the Qualified Immunity
doctrine serves as precedent, would make it practicable for
governments to defend conduct that arguably is permitted under
Establishment Clause jurisprudence, such as the acknowledgment of
religious heritage, without sacrificing deterrents to government
conduct that is clearly prohibited. The standard would help strike the
subtle balance required by Establishment Clause jurisprudence by
"neither abdicat[ing] our responsibility to maintain a division between
church and state nor evinc[ing] a hostility to religion by disabling the
government from in some ways recognizing our religious heritage." 194
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